Despite the fact that theoretical research on opportunistic political cycles is very intuitive and well developed, empirical literature has found fairly weak evidence of opportunistic political cycles. This paper tests the theory in a decade-old democracyRussia. We find strong evidence of very short opportunistic political cycles and provide evidence and explanation why many previous attempts to find evidence failed. Using the comprehensive list of Russia's regional elections and regional monthly panel data between 1996 and 2001, we find that: (1) opportunistic political cycles in regional fiscal policies are sizable and short-lived on average; (2) the magnitude of opportunistic cycles decreases with voters' rationality and awareness (measured by urbanization, computerization, education, and freedom of media); (3) there is a learning curve for voters: cycles become smaller with time; (4) cycles in fiscal policies increase political popularity and chances for re-election of incumbent governors. Our results confirm that maturity of democracy as well as rationality and awareness of electorate are very important factors in determination of the scope for opportunistic cycles. 
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Introduction
Despite the fact that theoretical research on opportunistic political cycles is very intuitive and well developed, empirical literature produced mixed results in attempts to find convincing evidence of opportunistic cycles for almost a quarter of a century after pioneering work of Nordhaus (1975) . 1 This apparent contradiction between the theory and evidence created an intellectual puzzle. Why did many tests fail? Should the theory or the empirics be held responsible? Motivated by this gap, several recent works argued that opportunistic cycles should be most sizable in developing countries with immature democratic regimes. 2 Although, the evidence has been strongly supportive of this view, the tests using data from the developing countries have not been very high-powered due to data limitations. 3 This paper attempts to shed further light on this puzzle by putting the opportunistic cycle theory to one more test using regional monthly panel data from a decade-old democracy.
According to the theory, asymmetric information and irrationality magnify the size of opportunistic cycles. 4 Thus, to ensure the maximum possible size of the cycles, the tests should be done in environment with these properties. This paper uses data from Russia's regional elections of executives. First, Russian democracy is very young and many regions are notorious for governor's control over mass media and large fraction of uninformed, naïve and myopic electorate. Second, detailed monthly 1 See Drazen (2000) and Franzese (2002) for detailed surveys of theoretical and empirical literatures. 2 See, for instance, Gonzalez (2000) . 3 See Gonzalez (2000) , Shi and Svensson (2001) , Block (2001) , Block, et. al. (2001) , Krueger and Turan (1993) . 4 Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , Rogoff (1990) , Gonzalez (2000) .
regional-level data allows more powerful tests of the theory than the ones that have been done so far. And third, high regional variation in possible determinants of opportunistic cycles, on the one hand, and high uniformity in many (would-beimportant and missing in most papers) controls like electoral institutions, scope for policymaking, culture, trust, etc., on the other, help to analyze how cycles vary with voters' rationality, awareness, and learning. Thus, Russia provides an ideal case for an empirical test of opportunistic political cycles. Indeed, we find very strong evidence of cycles in fiscal policies of Russian governors.
Two strands of literature, opportunistic political business cycles and partisan theory, explain inefficient economic fluctuations around elections. The literature on opportunistic cycles argues that electoral pressure forces politicians to manipulate public policy in order to increase chances of reelection with the help of pre-electoral improvements at expense of deterioration after elections. Low asymmetry of information between politicians and the public, rationality of voters, and availability of institutional checks and balances reduce opportunistic cycles. The alternative approach -partisan theory -argues that policies are predetermined by ideology.
Economic fluctuations arise as a result of policy changes when different parties alternate in office: each party in office focuses on the short run improvements for its own constituency. Binding commitments to co-operative common policy rule and reputation reduce partisan cycles. Kalecki (1943) was the first to develop the idea that politicians might alter policies in the face of elections. Subsequently, theory of opportunistic cycles and partisan theory developed in parallel. The theoretical literature came in two waves.
The first "non-rational" wave came in 1970s. Nordhaus (1975) built the first opportunistic model based on adaptive expectations of voters. Hibbs (1977) developed the first partisan model. Frey (1978) and Frey and Schneider (1978) combined the features of opportunistic theory and partisan theory to develop weak partisan theory. The second wave reconciled rational expectations with political cycles. Alesina (1987) built the rational partisan theory that attributed cycles to wage rigidities and uncertainly of election's outcome. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , Rogoff (1990) , Persson and Tabellini (1990) modeled rational opportunistic cycles that are based on asymmetry of information between the incumbent politician and the voters.
Adaptive expectations models exploited the Phillips curve framework and, thus, predicted cycles in growth, unemployment, and inflation. Opportunistic models based on rational expectations predict cyclical pattern in fiscal policies rather than real outcomes. Recently, Gonzalez (2000) extended the rational models to accommodate importance of the institutional context of policymaking: transparency and maturity of democratic traditions.
Empirical research so far revealed much stronger evidence of partisan than opportunistic cycles; particularly, it is apparent in studies of developed countries. For instance, using quarterly post-war US data, Alesina and Sachs (1988) found strong support for rational partisan theory and Klein (1996) little support for opportunistic cycles. Berger and Woitek (1997) rejected both partisan and opportunistic cycles in Germany on monthly data. Reid (1997) relaxed the assumption of exogeneity of election time and found weak evidence of opportunistic cycles in Canadian provinces. Alesina and Roubini (1992) tested the competing theories in a unified framework, using panel of 18 OECD countries with quarterly data, and found strong robust support for rational partisan cycles and, in selected countries, some evidence of rational opportunistic cycles.
Non-convincing evidence for opportunistic cycles in developed countries motivated the new wave of empirical research using data from developing countries with an emphasis on the determinants of cycles: for instance, development of democratic institutions and availability of checks and balances. Schuknecht (1998 Schuknecht ( , 2000 found evidence of cycles in budget expenditures and investment based on quarterly panel data for 25 developing countries and showed that cycles are much larger in countries with low inflation costs. Block (2001) used annual data for 69 developing countries to show that budget cycles took place only in countries with sufficient electoral competition. Block, et. al. (2001) confirmed this result on data for 44 African countries. In addition, they found that cycles got weaker as voters learned. Shi and Svensson (2000) analyzed data from 123 countries and also found some evidence of cycles, which is significantly stronger for developing countries. Gonzalez (2000) found some evidence of fiscal cycles in Mexico and showed that they are related to the levels of democracy and transparency. Thus, recent research with the focus on fiscal instruments in developing countries produced more convincing evidence of opportunistic cycles. This evidence, however, is not always as strong as one could expect and as it sounds. Important reasons for this are insufficient frequency of data and lack of appropriate controls; we address these problems in this paper. Keller and May (1984) used the case of President Nixon's election campaign to argue that one needs to look at the political actions rather than the real economic outcomes to find evidence of opportunistic cycles. Overall, pure (non-rational) theories à la Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) are proven to be inconsistent with results of virtually all empirical tests: Drazen (2000) surveys empirical literature to show that, when found, cycles affect fiscal and monetary policies rather than outcomes.
Based on the case of the four federal Russian elections, Treisman and Gimpelson (2001) argued that traditional empirical approach underestimates opportunistic cycles because it considers policy instruments separately, whereas, politicians change them from one election to another depending on political environment. Large samples, however, should allow observing opportunistic cycles in each policy instrument separately despite this underestimation.
This paper tests for the presence of opportunistic political cycles in Russian regions in a whole range of fiscal policy instruments as well as real economic outcomes. Then, it addresses the question of how rationality of voters, their access to unbiased information, and maturity of democracy affect the magnitude of the cycles.
Finally, we study whether opportunistic cycles help governors to get reelected.
We find opportunistic political cycles in many regional fiscal policies controlling for region-specific characteristics, federal trend, seasonality, and fluctuations driven by differences in ideology (partisan cycles). Just as predicted by the rational theory of opportunistic cycles, total budgetary expenditures, spending on education, healthcare, social disbursements, industrial subsidies, and mass media as well as repayments of wage arrears to public workers exhibit clear cyclical pattern.
They start to grow approximately nine months before elections, continue rising gradually, and jump high up one month before elections. Right after elections spending drops and wage arrears start to accumulate. Above average inflationary pressure, leads to price rises right after elections. Industrial growth is not significantly affected by elections in contrast to predictions of the first wave of non-rational opportunistic models à la Nordhaus (1975 
The data

Sample and data sources
The comprehensive list of regional governor elections that took place in Russia between August 1995 and June 2002 consists of 169 electoral events. 6 We exclude elections in Chechnya and Ingushetia from our sample because the fluctuations in fiscal policies of these regions have been driven by war rather than 5 The only paper that uses monthly data is Berger and Voitek (1997) . Even though, the data were suited well for the test, they reject hypothesis of opportunistic cycles for the German developed democracy. 6 This list covers elections in all regions but Dagestan, the only region where the governor is appointed. Overall, the first glance at the data tentatively suggests that fiscal policies are subject to opportunistic political cycles in the Russian regions. One, however, needs to see whether the visual results survive rigorous econometric analysis.
The first glance at the data
Hypotheses and empirical methodology
Test of opportunistic cycles
Theory of opportunistic cycles predicts that governors pursue expansionary fiscal and/or monetary policies before elections irrespective of their ideological platform. Rogoff and Sibert's (1988) model predicts that politicians manipulate fiscal policies in pre-election times with subsequent increase in inflation and no effect on real economic outcomes. Nordhaus's (1975) model predicts that cycles affect real economic activity: unemployment and GDP growth. We test whether these predictions are consistent with the data treating election dates as exogenous. Reid (1997) and Heckelman and Berument (1998) pointed out that opportunistic cycles can also occur as a result of setting election date at a time of a boom. We abstract from this possibility because less than 15% of Russia's regional elections happened more than a month of their expected date (the number insufficient for quantitative analysis); moreover, several times elections were shifted exogenously, because governors were promoted to the federal government before their terms ended.
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To test the existence of cycles and analyze their duration, we utilize the event study methodology. The following specification of panel regressions with regional fixed-effects was used:
where i -region; t -ordinal number of a month; y stands for a de-trended monthly instrument or outcome of regional policy.
8 m jit is a dummy that equals to 1, if t is j months away from elections in region i (negative j means that t is prior to elections, positive -that t is after elections, j=0 in the month of elections); f i -regional fixed effects. 9 Term equals to 0, 1, 2, or 3 depending on which term is the governor serves in office; 0 indicates that the governor is appointed and has not been elected before; 1 indicates that the governor was elected for the first time, etc.
is the average of the values of the policy instrument in the previous four months; this variable accounts for autocorrelation processes in equation (1). 10 Electoral campaign platforms of Russia's governors are polarized into the "communist left" and the "liberal-democratic ideology". 11 Left is a dummy that equals 1 if the incumbent 7 It is illegal to shift the date of regional elections. 8 The detailed description of how the policy instruments were de-trended is presented below in this section. 9 The regression has a constant term because f i 's joint mean is normalized to zero. 10 We use smoothed lagged value of the policy instruments because of better fit due to large month-tomonth volatility in the data. 11 Partisan theory implicates a priori differences in ideology: "communist left" ideology opts for a larger size of government and larger redistribution. This implies that, ceteris paribus, social expenditures, government deficit, and inflation should be greater if communist governors are in power.
governor is supported by the Communist Left wing coalition 12 . This dummy controls for the partisan cycles. The variation in the data is insufficient, however, to have a proper test of this theory because there are only seven cases when new governor of the opposite ideological platform replaced an incumbent governor after elections; and, therefore, ideology of governors is almost perfectly collinear with regional fixed effects. Thus, we do not put emphasis on the interpretation of the sign of coefficient of the "left-wing" dummy.
We consider three groups of policy instruments and outcomes: budgetary expenditures (total budgetary expenditures, expenditures on social programs, education, culture, healthcare, mass media, and subsidies to industry and agriculture), budgetary revenues and deficit (total budgetary revenues, tax revenues, and deficit) and economic performance indicators (growth, inflation, the level of industrial output, total wage arrears and regional wage arrears, wage level, price level and money income).
An important methodological question is how to control for the macroeconomic shocks and the federal policy that affects the regions. In particular, this is essential, because in 1996 at one instance, several regional elections and the federal elections took place in Russia. In order to eliminate the effects of the federal policy (which can also be cyclical in the face of the federal elections) we tried each of the three following options that produced the same results. 13 First, we defined each of the policy instruments as a ratio of the actual value of the instrument to the federal level of this variable (which is calculated as population-weighted average of the regional values). Second, we added the federal trend as regressor in the panel 12 The name of the coalition is Peoples Patriots Union of Russia ("Narodno-Patriotichesky Souz Rossii"); most governors in this coalition are the members of the Communistic Party of the Russian Federation. 13 The same approaches were used by Alesina and Roubini (1992) .
regression. Third, we added month dummies as regressors. The results of these three approaches are very similar, thus, throughout the paper we use the specifications of the first approach: all considered policy instruments and outcomes are already detrended.
Another methodological question is how to control for seasonal fluctuations. It is important because a large portion of regional elections had taken place in the same months (elections frequently happen in the end of the year, particularly often in December). We tried the following alternative strategies. First, to control for the common to all regions seasonal fluctuations, it is sufficient to include eleven month dummies in the regression or de-trend just as described in the previous paragraph.
Thus, controls for the federal trend take care of common to all regions seasonality.
Second, to control for region-specific seasonality, we included fixed effects for each of the region-month combinations (86 regions times 11 months) in equation (1). Each strategy produced very similar results in magnitude with a slight loss of significance in the latter case due to a significant loss of degrees of freedom. Thus, we report regression results for the control for common to all regions seasonality, since most seasonal fluctuations are common to all regions and, therefore, they are subtracted from the policy instruments together with the federal trend.
Significant coefficients at dummies indicating the time distance from elections (α j ) point toward the shifts in the autocorrelation process of the policy instrument.
Thus, positive significant values of the estimates of α j before elections and negative significant values of the estimates of α j after elections would serve as evidence of the opportunistic political cycles.
Lags in panel regressions may bias the estimators (Hansen, 1982 and White, 1982) . The bias converges to zero when time dimension of a panel goes to infinity.
Our monthly panel covers almost seventy months (six years). Therefore, the asymptotic properties can be applied. Nonetheless, we estimated equation (1) using the Arellano-Bond procedure (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Our results were not changed by this technique.
Determinants of opportunistic cycles
The second step of our analysis is the study of the determinants of the magnitude of opportunistic cycles. We test the predictions of the theory that the size of opportunistic cycles is negatively related to rationality of voters, access to unbiased sources of information, and the maturity of democracy (see, for instance, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Gonzalez (2000)).
As a measure of the amplitude of the cycle in a particular policy instrument for a particular election, we take the pre-electoral month deviation of the value of the policy instrument from the regional trend net of seasonal fluctuations. Thus, we define the amplitudes as pre-electoral month residuals from estimation of the following equation separately for each region in the sample:
As y it , we used only fiscal policy instruments, since they turned out to have the significant opportunistic cycles after estimation of equation (1). dm jt in equation (2) stands for month dummies corresponding to 12 calendar months. For all policy instruments, the mean amplitudes are positive and, for ten out of thirteen policy instruments, they are significant.
To examine which factors influence the magnitude of the cycles, we run the following equation on the pooled cross section of elections:
where i is the ordinal number of elections. A i is the amplitude of the cycle (as described above). R i is a proxy for rationality of voters and their awareness. We use the following measures of R i : the share of population with higher education, the number of computers per capita, the share of urban population, and the index of freedom of media production. Negative significant coefficient at R i is interpreted as evidence that irrationality or unawareness is associated with higher amplitude of the cycle. Real time (Time i ) was included in the regression to find out how cycles change with time, in other words, whether learning by voters and maturity of democracy decrease incentives to use cycles. Learning is not the only possible interpretation of the negative coefficient at Time i : an alternative story is the disciplining role of Putin's more centralized administration compared to Yeltsin's time. There has not been any formal institutional change in the regional elections mechanism and authority of regional governments over spending in their budgets from Yeltsin's to Putin's time, however. As before, Left i controls for the ideological platform of incumbents. In estimation of equation (3), from the sample we excluded elections that took place in 9
Autonomous Okrugs, the regions that are subdivisions of other larger regions.
Do cycles help wining?
Finally, we investigate whether it pays to pursue cyclical opportunistic policies. Russia's incumbent governors have been active in trying to retain power (95% of them ran for re-election) and they have been more successful than the opposition in attaining votes (66.5% of those who ran for another term won).
15 This is an impressive score considering deep recession that Russia experienced for most of the transition period. To test whether cycles helped incumbent governors to get reelected, we estimate how the probability to win and the share of incumbents' votes depend on the amplitude of the cycles and the time trend, controlling for the ideology of incumbent governor and governor's performance in the last term. We also test if the effect of cycles on the probability to win depends on proxies for rationality and learning. We estimate the following equations on the pooled cross section of elections: (5) where P i is the popularity of incumbent measured by the ratio of votes pro-to votes against incumbent on elections i. A i is the proxy for the aggregate amplitude of the cycles prior to elections i, equal to the first principal component of the main cyclical fiscal policies as in equation (3). R i are our proxies for rationality and awareness. The
are included to test whether rationality, awareness, and learning reduce the effectiveness of cyclical policies.
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Positive significant coefficient at A i is an indication that cycles help to get reelected.
Negative coefficients at cross-terms mean that rationality, awareness and time reduce the influence of the amplitude on chances of reelection. Control variables are as follows: Left i is as described above. Perform i is a column vector of proxies for governor's performance in the last term comprised of the differences between the overall regional means and the regional means over the last term for the following variables: log share of social expenditures, log labor productivity and log price level.
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Equation (5) is the multivariate ordered probit model with the same set of regressors as in (4) and with there outcomes for the incumbent: wins, is the first runner up, is below the second place. We also estimate simple probit model with two outcomes: wins/loses. Both approaches produce almost identical results. In estimation of equations (4) and (5), from the sample we exclude elections with the single candidate, elections, in which incumbent did not run for reelection and did not name his successor, and elections in Autonomous Okrugs. In addition, we used Cook's distance approach (Cook, 1977) to exclude four outliers that had excessively strong effect on our estimates.
There is an endogeneity problem in estimation of equations (4) and (5), however. If governors are sure of wining because their rating is too high, they would have weak incentives to use cyclical policy since it is costly in the long run. In this case, the tighter the electoral competition, the higher the incentives for pre-electoral manipulations. Thus, this link from popularity and probability to win to the incentives for cyclical behavior implies negative correlation between popularity and cycles. 16 Upper bars denote the mean values. Subtraction of means before taking the cross-term does not change the interpretation of the coefficient at the cross-term, but makes the interpretation of the coefficients of A i easier: it becomes equal to the full effect of the amplitude, evaluated at R and Time . Thus, if there are governors that are sure of re-election, we are likely to underestimate a positive causal relationship between the magnitude of the cycles and the probability to win with regressions (4) and (5). 18 One could argue that too low probability to win may also reduce incentives for cyclical policy because budgetary resources instead of being spent in favor of voters could be diverted by incumbents who are sure of losing.
This would have implied that we overestimate the causal effect of the magnitude of the cycles on popularity. There have not, however, been regional elections so far in Russia where incumbent governors did not have a good chance of wining. Therefore, overall we are likely to underestimate the effect. 
Results
The results of estimation of equation (1) are presented in tables 2 and 3. Table   2 presents regression results for fiscal policy instruments. Total budgetary expenditures experience the first significant jump up of 5.5% nine months before elections; then, up until month 3 prior to elections, there are no significant rises in expenditures (coefficients are mostly positive, but insignificant); at month 3 prior to elections, the second significant jump up in total expenditures of 6% occurs, the next and the biggest rise in expenditures of 11% happens one month before elections. The election month and the month right after the elections are characterized by the significant falls in total budget expenditures of 6% and 5%, respectively. We do not find significant changes in total expenditures after the month 2. Budgetary expenditures on education, culture, and healthcare follow the same but slightly more profound pattern. Education expenditures rise significantly by 6% twelve months 18 Cook's distance approach eliminated observations in which incumbents have the highest political rating. Therefore, it partly eliminated this problem. 19 Instrumenting the amplitude is the way to solve this problem, but we do not have a good instrument.
prior to elections. All three expenditure items jump up by 14, 12, and 23%, respectively, in the three consecutive months, eight months before elections. Six months before elections, education and healthcare expenditures rise by 5% each.
Cultural expenditures fall by 5% four months before elections. Healthcare spending jumps up by 6.5% two months before elections. Education, culture and healthcare expenditures jump up again by 13, 11, and 17%, respectively, one month before elections. These expenditure items fall by 7, 19, and 10% respectively during the three months right after the elections. Budgetary revenues grow by 5% one month before elections and decrease by 14% during two months right after elections. Taxes significantly jump up only three months before elections by 5% and fall right after elections by 6%. Budget deficit, e.g. ratio of expenditures to revenues, exhibits significant increases six, four, and one month before elections (by 8, 4, and 6%, respectively). Thus, incumbent governors pursue expansionary policy while trying not to overburden enterprises with taxation. Table 3 presents the effect of elections on dynamics of real economic outcomes and wage arrears. Regional growth does not exhibit a significant cyclical pattern. The level of industrial output falls down significantly both before and after elections. This finding can be explained by tougher tax collection before elections (e.g., tax increase 3 months prior to elections) and lower industrial subsidies after elections. Tax reduction after elections can be attributed to post-electoral recession since magnitudes of their changes are similar.
Inflation does not shift significantly around elections, but the price level does.
After elections price level increases significantly in months 2, 3, 4, 11, and 12. (Each of these increases, however, is very small -below half a percent). Although price increases after elections are econometrically significant, they are much smaller in magnitude than fluctuations in fiscal policy instruments. Thus, our fiscal policy cycles results hold irrespective of whether we take real or nominal values of the policy instruments. 21 Money income falls slightly in the middle of the year before elections, but grows in three pre-electoral months by 3, 8 and 11%. Wage level grows 2% in the pre-electoral month and falls by approximately 3% in months 3 and 4 after elections. 21 We tested for presence of cycles in nominal policy instruments directly (disregarding the price differences between regions). The results were the same.
Arrears in wages to public workers are repaid before elections. Wage arrears decline each month during the whole year prior to elections with the rate of approximately 4% per month and stabilize after elections. Wage arrears from the regional budgets start to decline nine months before elections, continue decreasing with a growing pace up until elections and also stabilize after elections. The total drop in regional wage arrears over the nine months before elections amounts to 77% of the initial level.
Overall, we find very strong evidence of opportunistic cycles in fiscal policies and no evidence of pre-electoral expansion in economic growth. Our results are fully consistent with opportunistic cycles à la Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and inconsistent with opportunistic cycle theory à la Nordhaus (1975) : There is no output expansion before elections. Such policies as wage arrears repayments, social expenditures, and spending on mass media are the main instruments of fiscal pre-electoral manipulations. Cycles are very short: the largest shifts in policy instruments occur within a month or two from the election date.
Let us turn to the discussion of determinants of the size of cycles. Table 4 presents the results of estimation of equation (3) Time, our proxy for learning and maturity of democracy, also negatively significantly affects the size of the cycle. Cycles fade away relatively fast: Each additional year decreases the magnitude of cycles by about 3.5%. Thus, maturity of democracy is an important factor reducing opportunistic cycles. We also estimated the effect of an additional round of regional elections in an average region just as was done by Block, et. al. (2001) : An additional election in a region reduces the magnitude of the cycles by approximately 34%. Thus, the second wave of regional elections had substantially smaller cycles. Time in our opinion is a more appropriate measure of learning and maturity of democracy because voters can learn from other electoral events like federal elections, elections in regional legislature, etc. Table 5 presents the results of the test whether cycles help to get reelected (estimation of equations (4) and (5)). We find strong evidence of political benefits of cyclical policies: ceteris paribus, an increase in magnitude of the fiscal policy cycle significantly affects the political rating of the incumbent governor and the probability of re-election. A 10% increase in the magnitude of the cycle leads to a 4% growth in incumbents' popularity. We should emphasize that we most probably underestimate the effect of the cycles on chances to get re-elected because of possible endogeneity (discussed in the methodology section) and because we assumed the same mix of fiscal policy instruments for the measure of magnitude across regions. Cross-terms are insignificant in all regressions, except that the cross-term of the amplitude and computerization has negative significant coefficient in regression of incumbent's popularity: the effect of cycles on incumbent's popularity decreases with computerization. Thus, there is no robust relationship between the effect of cycles on popularity, on the one hand, and learning and rationality, on the other.
Conclusion
In this paper we tested for existence of opportunistic political cycles and studied whether rationality, awareness and maturity of democracy has effect on cycles. We also examined if cycles increase governors' chances to get reelected and if this effect depends on rationality and learning. The monthly regional panel data allowed us to define timing of the cycles more precisely than it has been done in the literature and avoid problems with usually missing institutional controls.
We found very strong evidence that: 2) The magnitude of the cycles decreases with education, urbanization, computerization, and the freedom of media as well as with time. Thus, informational symmetry, rationality and maturity of democracy are very important factors influencing cycles.
3) The scale of pre-electoral improvements increases popularity of incumbent governors and the probability to get re-elected. This effect is not robustly related to maturity of democracy or proxies for rationality and awareness: Of all our proxies, only computerization decreases the effect of cycles on chances to get reelected.
The main contribution of our paper to the existing literature on opportunistic cycles is in showing why previous studies underestimated the cycles. First, quarterly frequency of data is insufficient: cycles are short-lived. And second, in maturing democracy cycles disappear very fast. Ten years of Russia's democratic tradition very significantly reduced cycles. Each round of regional elections reduces cycles by over 30%.
Russian democracy is very young. Thus, the presence of cycles itself may not be such a bad piece of news because it confirms that there is some electoral pressure on Russia's governors. Thus, so-called "administrative resource", e.g., the ability to influence the vote count, does not completely annihilate political incentives. Evidence suggests that voters learn quite fast, and therefore, Russian governors are bound to respond to the political pressures in increasingly more efficient way. 
